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"Transition to what?"  this major puzzle of the transformation studies appears to be
solved in Hungary. In 1998 the Hungarian social system is democratic capitalism. Viewed
in the perspective of the countrys own past, this outcome is a success. Between 198998
the longest and most democratic period of Hungarys post-World War I history coupled
with the most radical episode of economic liberalization it ever experienced. 
How to assess Hungarys present situation in the broader context of overall
economic and political developments in post-socialist Eastern Europe? The regional
perspective suggests that in terms of parting with state socialism and building market
democracy Hungary  and a few other countries including Poland  represents the
maximum any former socialist state could achieve between 198998. While in this
respect no country succeeded in getting farther, most other states have struggled with
the peaceful or forceful formation of national identity or a new, independent state, which
often dominated over and conflicted with, the issues of economic reforms and
democratization on the transformation agenda. Another key to success is that Hungary
similar to Poland, but to a much larger extent  became a major target for foreign direct
investment. This is due to a number of factors: from Hungarys strategy for debt,
macroeconomic management and privatization, to the foreign investorss and creditorss
own expectations. However, the resulting large capital inflow had a major impact on the
features of Hungarian capitalism. While everywhere in East the new ownership structure
displays various combinations of foreign owners, "national capitalists", and the scattered
property rights of workers, the proportions dramatically differ. In much of the East the
cohort of foreign investors is entirely missing, while national capitalists of often doubtful
origin, skills and strategies acquired overwhelming share and influence. At the other
extreme, in former GDR virtually the whole business elite is "foreign": West-German or
of other Western origin. On this scale Hungary, with a one-third of its largely private
economy in foreign hands [Hegymenet, 1998: 163] in 1997 is closest to the former GDR
 and at the same time farthest from the other extreme exhibited by Eastern "national
capitalisms". This location makes the Hungarian case specific and hints both at the risks
the country avoided and the ones it took.
Where does the secret of Hungarian success lie? I believe that both past, and present
matters: the success is both due to the favourable legacies of socialism, and the patterns
of resolving the conflicts between the capitalist and democratic components of
transformation. Hence in section 2 of my essay I shall ask how has democratic politics
affected the process and the outcome of capitalist transformation? Given that the pattern
5
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 31  Consolidating Economic Reforms ...of interaction between politics and the economy was also shaped by the risks and
opportunities of the international  environment, external factors are going to get ample
weight in my explanation too. While my analysis covers the whole transformation period,
in section 3 I take a closer look at the second half of the decade, and at the politics of
consolidating economic reforms. Section 4 is devoted to the assessment of the political
and economic costs and worrisome side-effects of Hungarys road to freedom. Finally I
conclude, and offer a few lessons.
2. 198998: Ten Years of Social Patience
The implementation of the market-oriented strategy in Hungary was difficult
throughout the whole decade. On one hand, macroeconomic tensions reflecting the
harsh initial conditions, the collapse of the Soviet markets, and policy failures meant ever-
present challenges for politicians and policy makers. On other hand the political and social
legacy of the socialist system, and the rules, institutions and conflicts characteristic to
democratic politics had an immense impact on the transformation and gave support to
the idea that creating capitalism after the breakdown of socialism is an eminently political
project [Kornai, 1988]. Hence to understand how and at what cost Hungary has become
a market society the best is to ask how it succeeded in balancing the political and
economic dimensions of social change.
Let us recall first that initially most observers did not give much credit to the
viability of democratic capitalism after state socialism. Indeed, scenarios of
destabilization or breakdown under post-socialism have become more profoundly
elaborated than those of the collapse of socialism ever were. Often, these gloomy
prophecies contradicted to each other, but neither their contrasts, nor their criticism
got too much attention. Firstly, a number of liberal economists and policy makers
worried that delays or deadlocks of radical economic reforms could lead to political
and economic destabilization and, even to a new turn to populist authoritarianism. But
secondly, on the Left, social scientists and politicians argued the opposite: that it is
excessive economic liberalism, where the danger to freedom and democracy
ultimately comes from. Thirdly, many historians and political scientists believed the
political, cultural, and social legacy of state socialism had been almost entirely
negative, and could become a massive obstacle to the emergence of the new social
system. Finally, there were fears, that democracy came "too early", and political
competition could undermine state capacity to radical reform.
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socialist legacies, and the democracy itself, did contribute to stability rather than to
destabilization in the first period of the Hungarian transformation. They did so in three
ways: (1) by creating winners who supported (or at least did not oppose) the
transformation; (2) patient losers who granted reformist politicians with relatively long
"grace periods", and (3) by leaving behind domestic and external constraints to
irresponsible economic adventurism.
2.1. Empowered Winners
Firstly, Hungarian socialism improved the chances of powerful economic elit-groups,
whose behavior was important if democratic capitalism was to survive, to become winners
of privatization. Thus for them, both capitalism paid, and democracy was acceptable: they
were not interested in derailing the transformation process [Ost, 1992]. I refer to the
empirically well-documented argument that the last Hungarian socialist governments
created and left behind the legal and institutional infrastructure  laws regulating the
commercialization, and privatization of public firms  helping the most competitive
elements of the managerial stratum to become powerful in the emerging capitalist elite
[Urbán, 1991]. There were other factors of their legacy which both enhanced their
competitive advantages against domestic rivals  small private entrepreneurs, and
"expectant" client-capitalists  and enabled them to easier ally with external challengers:
foreign direct investors. It was their skills inherited from Hungarian reform socialism: in part
their experience as "public entrepreneurs" in mixed formal-informal, state-market
strategies, organizations and institutions which "got the job" of keeping economic activity
afloat "done" [Róna-Tas, 1997; Stark and Bruszt, 1998: 128]. Their other skill was their
familiarity with foreign markets, investment, licensing contracts, partnerships, and joint
ventures which became a common practice by 1980s, and explain the remarkable openness
of the Hungarian managerial elite to foreign capital, and specifically to alliences and
cooperation with foreign investors. As a consequence the emerging business elite exhibited
a more moderate and less insatiable domestic managerial element, whose acquisition
strategies considered privatization less as a zero-sum game, than actors of other Eastern
"national capitalisms". Secondly, unlike in other countries the state did not collapse in
Hungary by 198990 [see also Murrell, 1996], and the most powerful cohorts of Hungarian
administrative elite  the policy-making and financial bureaucracy  was in a relatively good
shape and favorable position to enforce the administrative changes required to the conduct
of the market-oriented economic strategy: a point to which I shall return later.
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Other elements of the socialist legacy contributed to the overwhelmingly patient
attitude of losers of transformation. I believe it was mainly due to them, that the political
dynamics of the Hungarian transformation exhibited a different pattern than the
disruptive social response to the first wave of radical crisis-management and adjustment
in late 1970s and early 1980s in many Third World countries [1]. Fears of similar
developments have frequently been expressed in the Eastern context by politicians,
political analysts and social scientists alike. However, these fears missed two important
points. One is that the "IMF-riots" of Latin America typically challenged authoritarian
regimes, and signalled the turn to democracy, rather than to dictatorship [2]. Another
neglected aspect was that the post-socialist countries differed from the more rebellious
societies of the Third World in a number of structural, cultural and institutional aspects.
These in "East" have become a basis for political patience even in critical situations when
explosive political protest was the more probable response in "South". To put it
differently, in part, the socialist legacy have had a demobilizing, and, consequently,
politically stabilizing effect. The explanation that socialism left behind societies
characterized by a relative lack of the structural, cultural and institutional factors
associated with violent collective action seems to be especially powerful in the Hungarian
case. It is the following legacies and effects that deserve particular attention.
When the changes began large popular sectors in Hungary had yet at their disposal
relatively substantial reserves to survive hard times. To be sure, their resources were
modest in absolute terms: but at least they had not been devoured by hyperinflation or
confiscation of the populations forced savings held responsible for the "monetary
overhang" [3]. In this sense the fact that the state did not "whither away", and did not lose
control over the macroeconomic fundamentals was another positive element of the
socialist legacy. As a consequence, the absence of extreme income inequality and of
poverty of a Third World type  that is, concentrated in overpopulated and politically
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[1] Often, the initial response to crisis and adjustment in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World
was severe, massive and violent protest: food riots, general and political strikes, clashes with the armed forces,
and escalation of guerrilla-warfare resulting in declarations of state of emergency and imposing of martial law,
or, alternatively, in withdrawing economic reform measures, replacing key ministers, ousting governments, or
returning to civilian rule [Walton, and Seddon, 1994].
[2] Also, the violent economic revolts lost momentum by the late 1980s: in this sense many new Latin
American democracies appeared to be more crisis-proof, than the old military regimes.
[3] Obviously, Poland where the changes were preceded by gallopping inflation, was less fortunate in this
respect which partly explains why Polish society was somewhat less "patient" than the Hungarian. explosive informal urban settlements  may have contributed to weakening the threat of
violent political mass actions. Even if poverty and inequality dramatically increased during
the last decade, it continues to be far below Third World standards both in terms of its
extent, and concentration. To be simple, Budapest has not yet become Lima, Sao Paulo
or Djakarta. These effects could be reinforced by cultural factors such as the substantially
higher education standards, or by a characteristic element of Hungarian political memory:
the experience that  as it happened in and after 1956  revolutionary violence breeds
horrifying counter-revolutionary retaliation.
Such structural legacies as the countrys demographic characteristics certainly
mattered as well. The Hungarian society is more aged and less urbanized than most of
the rebellious Third World nations. Elderly people in general, and pensioners in particular,
could not strike or riot, even if they felt aggrieved, and typically neither could members
of the rural society who lived dispersed in the countryside. When urban socialist
industries in Hungary collapsed redundant labor migrated back to villages and other
small-scale settlements and got stuck there contributing to the emergence of "pockets of
rural poverty": of economically depressed and marginalized regions lackig any public
infrastructure and jobs as well as the chances and resources for collective protest.
Consequently, major social groups, like the poor, the pensioners, and much of the rural
population have had to tolerate economic hardships. If they have associated their
grievances with the strategy of economic transformation, their only avenue of protest has
been to vote against the reformist governments [4].
Labour protest, the contentious political action of the lower, and lower-middle
classes of the Kádár-regime, did not significantly shape Hungarian transformation politics
either. At the beginning this could have been, because the potential organizers, the ex-
communist National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ) and its allies,
were suffering both from a dramatic loss of union rank and file, and credibility problems.
Their lost credibility was due to their socialist legacy: their intimate ties with the
communist party. It is also true that the few new unions that were credible, among them
the League of Democratic Trade Unions  similar to Polands Solidarnoæ  initially
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[4] There was, however, rural protest in Hungary, organized by the Smallholders Party, and, in 1997 by the
emerging new association of better off agricultural producers. Also, with respect to the political behavior of
Polish peasants I am aware of the fact that they  or at least their representatives in politics  were in general
less patient than rural population in Hungary. Clearly what matters is not just the geographic dispersion of the
population, but its interaction with other  organizational and cultural  factors of mobilization. As far as the
pensioners are concerned, it is also interesting to think about to what extent the policy of early retirement
widely used for solving employment problems and conflicts in Poland, and dramatically increasing the share of
retired seniors in the society might have contributed to the dominance of overall social patience during the
Polish transformation.favored reform. Later, however, the transformational recession [Kornai, 1994]  the
decline in living standards, and the loss of job security associated with rapidly growing
unemployment  has curbed the rest of labors contentious mood. Finally, one more
institutional factor, also originating partly in the Hungarian socialist past  the tradition of
collusion between labour unions and management  may have contributed to the
cooperative rather than confrontational stance adopted by most unions [5].
Finally, in different forms and to different degrees, all population groups, including the
workers, the poor, the elderly, and the rural population have had an important alternative
to protest: "going informal". Led by cultural and behavioural norms left behind by
socialism  e. g. that laws do not matter and theft from state is morally permissible  one-
third of Hungarian population (and not only the poor) retreated to the second economy:
another socialist legacy, also revitalized by the crisis and massive social dislocation.
Noncriminal exit forms may also have had a positive stabilizing effect, at least in the short
run [Sík 1994] [6]. 
All in all, instead of protesting violently and directly, Hungarians remained patient and
either went informal or exploited their employers' capacity to enforce protective state
intervention until this was still possible. Whatever social tensions remained effective, their
direct influence was neutralized either by government tactics aiming at dividing losers by
partial compensation, or by the democratic political institutions. Both Hungarian
democratic governments abundantly used pre-emptive partial compensation: from
political side-payments to unions to politically targeted pension-, wage- or social benefit-
increases. However, I believe it was even more important, that democracy
institutionalized protest-vote as the standard weapon to express economic grievances 
it became much more popular (and was less costly) than riots, strikes, or violent
demonstrations. In politics, Hungarians typically preferred protest votes, and channelling
their demands through democratic institutions to more disruptive tactics. Thus the
democratic system contributed to the success of economic transformation by providing
a safety-valve for socio-economic tensions.
The characteristic political dynamics presented above  the alternation between
extended periods of political patience with protest and retaliation only during elections 
is one of the keys to the politics of the Hungarian economic transformation. On one hand,
societys overwhelmingly patient and democratic attitude has provided democratic
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[5] This, again, is to some extent different in the Polish case, where labor was more contentious, although
according to the data available strike activity in Poland did not reach critical levels and did not paralyze the
economy, and its intensity fell throughout the last decade [Ekiert, and Kubik, 1996].
[6] Another similarity between Poland and Hungary: data show a large extent of informalization of the
economy.reformist governments with longer grace periods and longer time horizons in which to
implement difficult reforms [7]. On other hand the politicians fear from protest vote
mostly (but not only) before elections was still there, which is a partial explanation for
why reforms were sometimes delayed, "watered down", or lost radicalism in other ways.
Finally, the fact that social discontent was expressed mostly in democratic form
contributed not only to the success of economic transformation, but also to the
stabilization of the main institutions and actors of democracy, e.g. the political parties.
Was the protest expressed by votes effective? Were electorates able to radically
change the transformation strategy? Did the economic hardships of Hungarian population
substantially decline during the past decade? My answer is rather negative. What mostly
happened was that Hungarians voted out economic policies injurious to their immediate
interests, only to witness their recurrence under different party banners: in Hungary first
in Christian-Democratic, then ex-communist Socialist, and Liberal, and most recently,
center-right and Liberal ideological colors [8]. 
2.3. Constraints
Finally, I believe the fact that the main stream of the transformation strategy could be
maintained is partly explained by the  external and domestic  constraints left behind by
socialism. Specifically, in the early period of Hungarian transformation the economy
affected politics mainly by the constraints posed by its critical shape. Although Hungary
started its transformation with a relatively less devastated economic landscape than most
other post-socialist states, its macroeconomic situation in 1991, 1992 and 1993 was far
from permitting any populist or social democratic "deviation" from the main stream of
stabilization and structural adjustment policies. From the beginning, the effect of
domestic macroeconomic constraints had been reinforced by external constraints: the
international "rules of the game" to which Hungarian politicians became increasingly
committed during the 1990s. While keeping all the above said in mind let us now take a
closer look at how politics affected economic policy making and vice versa in the period
of consolidating Hungarian democratic capitalism.
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[7] Mainly for political institutional reasons  the initial absence of minimal threshold of political support
required to entering the parliament  the Polish political process was more "hectic" in this respects: and policy
makers were granted much shorter "grace periods" than in Hungary [Balcerowicz, 1995]. However, after the
threshold was introduced, Polish politics in this respect became more similar to the Hungarian.
[8] This seems to have happened in similar ways in Poland where not only center-right and liberal, but also
ex-Communist coalitions parties implemented largely market-oriented economic policies.12
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3. Four Years of "Rush Towards Capitalism" (199498)
One important approach to the political economy of policy reform offers a number
of suggestions about why and how the political dynamics of sustaining economic
transformation under democratic rule differs from the initial reform phase [9]. In this
view sustaining economic transformation may face growing difficulties and even harder
political challenges than initiating the departure from the old system [10].  Specifically, it
is suggested that in the consolidation phase the pace of reforms has a tendency to slow
down, and their initiation and implementation requires new government tactics
representing a shift from "imperative" to a more "interactive" style [11], implying
negotiation and cooperation with a wide array of political and bureaucratic actors and
diverse social interest groups.
Let us test the above propositions on the Hungarian case  specifically the politics of
policy making in the areas of restructuring and privatization of large SOEs, and the
banking sector, foreign trade strategy, debt-management, and state household reforms 
under Gyula Horns government based on the supermajority coalition between the ex-
communist Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats
(SZDSZ) in 199498.
To begin with, in all above areas, the period of consolidation, especially between
199598) witnessed an acceleration, rather than a slowing down of the pace of economic
reforms [Kornai, 1995a]. Secondly, although political protest certainly intensified after the
initiation of the Hungarian "Balcerowicz-plan", Finance Minister Lajos Bokross stabilization
and adjustment package on March 12, 1995, it was far from being excessive, or becoming
a serious obstacle to implementation [12]. Thirdly, while the government had several
[9] My summary is based on Nelson (1994; 1318).
[10] This may happen for the following reasons. (1) While the social costs of transformation rapidly
increase after the first reform measures, it takes much longer time for the benefits to materialize. Reformers
may face losers opposition, while they may not count yet on the winners support. (2) Later stage reforms 
such as financial sector reforms, privatization and restructuring large SOEs, liberalization of labor markets, and
reforms of the social welfare system  are administratively more complex, and require more legislative and
institutional preparation than e.g. subsidy cuts, price liberalization, or foreign trade liberalization. (3) Finally, the
political context shifts as well: times of "extraordinary politics" [Balcerowicz, 1995; 311] are followed by periods
of "politics as usual", characterized by dwindling willingness to sacrifice, and the consolidation of the political
sphere in terms of "a wider and more pushy array of interests" [Nelson, 1994; 15].
[11] These terms are used by Hausner (1993).
[12] In this respect the repeated intervention of the Constitutional Court which declared many (although
neither all, nor the most important) measures anti-constitutional posed a more formidable challenge to Bokros
and his men.attempts to apply an "interactive" approach in forms of encompassing socioeconomic pacts,
or political and bureaucratic consultations and negotiations, most (though not all) of those
attempts failed, and actual implementation typically exhibited the "imperative style".
Apparently we have a few puzzles to solve: how and why could the transformation
accelerate, and why did all this happen under the above mentioned political and
bureaucratic conditions? I demonstrate below that the pace of economic transformation
between 199598 could accelerate, and the reforms could stick not least because of both
the positive, and negative legacies left behind by József Antalls government. In this sense
there are reasons to stress the aspect of continuity, rather than of rupture between the
first and the second Hungarian governments [13].
3.1. New International Political and Economic Commitments
Firstly, in continuity with the late Kádár-regime, but maximally taking advantage of the
new situation the Antall-government made crucial political commitments, reinforcing
Hungarys wish to reintegrate into the world economy and outlining increasingly concrete
agendas for Hungarys return to the West and, specifically, to Europe. As far as foreign
affairs and economic diplomacy is concerned, by signing the Association Agreement with
the EU in december 1991, creating the CEFTA with the Visegrád-countries in early 1993,
maintaining and intensifying Hungarys memebership in The World Bank, IMF , WTO and
GATT, expressing Hungarys wish to become full members of the NATO, and the EU
completed the countrys departure from socialism, increased the cost of deviating from the
chosen path, and paved the way for later steps of integration such as Hungarys OECD-
membership in Spring 1995, or the forthcoming successes of getting closer to both NATO,
and EU. All these steps followed a rather similar path in Poland.
However, with respect to international integration the most crucial difference
between the Hungarian and Polish strategy was Hungarys different approach to its
external debts: the Antall government opted against asking for rescheduling and debt-
forgiveness [14]. This choice might explain much of the later divergence between the
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[13] In this respect my interpretation is different from János Kornais who in terms of the pace of economic
transformation demonstrates the continuity of economic gradualism between the late Kádár regime, and the
Antall-government, but mainly stresses the aspect of discontinuity between the latter, and the radicalism of the
Horn-government [Kornai, 1995a]. I accept his view on the faster pace of reforms under Horn, but I highlight
how this acceleration originated in the measures under Antall.
[14] To be sure, Hungary had minimal chances to follow the Polish road for the different structure of its
debts, and because of its relatively modest political importance for the West. However, Hungary did not even
push strongly for debt-relief.  Hungarian and Polish performance in privatization and foreign direct investment, and, as
a consequence, of the ownership dynamics and pattern of their emerging capitalisms. On
one hand, Hungary, from the starts was highly dependent on hard currency cash receipts
from privatization, which implied aggressive strategies of selling-off state property to
foreigners. Specifically neither could Hungary "afford" systematic delays in privatization,
nor could it widely apply methods of free property distribution, or labor inclusion in the
privatization process. Poland applied both latter forms more extensively. On other hand,
it is partly for the Hungarian way of debt-management why foreign investors might have
had a more positive view of Hungary than of Poland initially, and why Hungary could
count on much larger capital inflows from the beginning [15]. However, selling for hard-
currency cash was not easy: on one hand there was an intensive process of "spontaneous
privatization" was underway, and on the other, the Hungarian state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) were suffering from excessive bad debts, and the banking sector from crippling
problem-loans in early 1990s [16]. All this posed the Antall-government the difficult tasks
of both regaining control over the spontaneous processes, and improving the financial
standing of both the SOEs, and the banking sector. I argue below that a number of
important administrative and institutional reforms and structural measures and
institutional reforms implemented between 199094 paved the way for accelerated
marketization later.
3.2. (Re)centralized Privatization, and Restructuring the SOEs    
and Banking
Firstly, right at the beginning of its term the Antall-government (re)centralized
privatization by rendering the State Privatization Agency (SPA) under government
control [17].
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[15] A similar view is expressed in Brada (1996; 78).
[16] The bad debts forced by non-payments of the debtors to their suppliers, the social security system,
and accumulating as problem loand in the banking sector had multiple negative effects: they delayed structural
change, slowed down the effect of macroeconomic stabilization measures, and became an obstacle to both
financial stability and privatization both in the firms sector, and the banking system.
[17] While these measures got passionate criticism for their statist and centralizing features, and for
allegedly slowing down privatization, looking back from the perspective of the past decade, and also assessing
the Hungarian case in a regional context I believe this move had been reasonable: it was arguably wise to
reinforce state control over spontaneity and state capacity against the tendency of loss of control experienced
in many other cases in East.Secondly, from late 1991 till 1994 the Antall-government took several controversial steps
implying first methods of "creative destruction", and later state structural policies to cope
with the above challenge. In December 1991 the government implemented the law on
financial institutions, which "brought Hungarian practice up to those of the European Union.
This was the first serious legislation on banking in the region, and...uncovered much of the
financial strain inevitable under restructuring and recession [Csaba, 1995: 224]. This was
soon followed by the implementation of the law on accounting ripping off much of the fictive
revenues which had helped the firms to cover their losses before. As a combined effect both
the banks and the SOEs became more interested in enforcing payments from their debtors
[Jelentések az alagútból, 1994; 745]. The institutional vehicle of enforcement was provided
by the implementation of a severe bankruptcy legislation which between April 1992 to
December 1993 produced 16000 cases of bankruptcies: a number unprecedented in the
whole region. Some analysts argue that the combined and shockwise implementation of the
three laws had been "wanton" but not "creative destruction" [Stark-Bruszt, 1998; 131],
especially because the timing was unfortunate  the firms budget constraints were hardened
just at the moment when their Eastern markets collapsed   and because the bankruptcies
had a domino-effect: healthy firms were made insolvent by the decline of their debtors
[Jelentések, 1994; 35] [18]. From 1992 the enforced processes of structural change were
both shaped and mitigated by two other sets of structural policy measures: between
199294 several packages of consolidating the banking sector, and consolidating and
reorganizing a number of large SOEs  including 14 large firms and until 1994 55 other
companies (later their number substantially increased). Especially in 199394 in the
framework of the sole large public "investment program" of the period the government
bailed out the largest state banks while requiring them to clean their balances and implement
crucial, efficiency-enhancing changes in their organization, financial structures, and business
strategies. Large debtor SOEs, in turn had to contract reorganization plans with their
creditor banks and other large creditors, the Social Security Funds, and the Tax Office. In
exchange they were granted debt forgiveness and new capital injections recycled from the
privatization revenues [19] (see Table 1 in Appendix).
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[18] While these claims are justified, and the structural policies of the Antall-government indeed had an
element of "overkill" I wonder whether better solutions had been in sight, and specifically whether they had
been feasible under the Hungarian conditions. Specifically, I belive that the Czech attempt to solve the problem
favored and conceptualized by Stark, and Bruszt (1998) as restructuring by "deliberative associations" was
neither superior to the Hungarian solution, nor feasible under the Hungarian conditions of heavy indebtedness,
and macroeconomic instability.  
[19] The programs of bank-consolidation and firm reorganization got severe and justified criticism for their
high costs, the dirigist and protectionist style of  state intervention, and the rent-seeking and moral hazard
involved.To sum up the combined positive effect of the measures above: the cleaning up of
their balances and their improved capitalization subsequently made Hungarian SOEs
and banks more attractive for foreign strategic investors. There was another
development originating in the structural policies of the Antall-government, which 
while it was worrisome from the viewpoint of indigenous firms, had a positive effect on
greenfield foreign investment. Both the recession accompanying the wave of
bankruptcies in 199293, and the hardening of the Hungarian banks budget constraints
implied that Hungarian companies had to withdraw from their traditional markets both
in Hungary and abroad [20]. The gaps were quickly filled by both the acquisitions, and
greenfield investment of export-oriented foreign multinational corporations, and
intensified operations of fully foreign owned subsidiaries of large and small banks on the
Hungarian domestic market of financial services. All in all I consider the policies and
results of the Antall-period as "investments" into privatization and financial
restructuring under the Horn-government [21].
3.3. Politics of Accelerated Reforms in 199598
Finally, there was a third legacy, and this was negative: while the Antall-
government bore substantial economic and political costs for its measures in terms of
skyrocketting unemployment, decreased state revenues, increased public
expenditure, and collapsing exports, in macroeconomic terms it also left behind a
close-to-financial-meltdown-situation for its successor. For Hungary, then, similar to
the period of parting with socialism, the next phase of consolidating capitalism started
in economic crisis. Nine months were wasted with rivalries between Premier Gyula
Horn, and his top policy maker Finance Minister László Békesi [Greskovits, 1998b],
until further dramatic deterioration of the countrys external and domestic balances,
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[20] By 1991 the Antall-government also completed trade liberalization by mastering its most difficult
phase, and exposed the most sensitive parts of Hungarian economy to import-competition. However, the
bankruptcies had especially severe effect in the Hungarian export-industries. Of course, the loss of external
markets was not a simple outcome of the policies implemented: clearly the most important factor was the
collapse of the Soviet economy in 199293. What brought especially hard times for Hungarian firms was the
simultaneity of the above processes.  
[21] In this sense, I believe the tasks of economic and political consolidation cannot be mechanically
rendered to the second democratic Hungarian government. Rather the periods of initiating and consolidating
both economic and political transformations had been overarching, and the tasks had been shared by both
governments. This is why the politics of Hungarian transformation was in part different from what the political
economy of policy reforms would expect: in both periods, and, specifically, under the Horn-government.increasing capital flight, and the pressure of external actors made decisive steps
imperative: Békesi resigned, and the new Finance Minister Lajos Bokros initiated a
drastic stabilization and adjustment package on March 12, 1995 (see Table 2 in
Appendix).
Bokros advocated sustainable, fast and balanced, primarily export-led growth based
on domestic savings [Bokros, 1996; 825]. His package consisted a combination of
stabilization measures including a sharp devaluation, the introduction of a crawling peg for
Hungarian Forint (HUF), and a surcharge for imports. It also was an attempt to maintain
macroeconomic stability without recession and facilitate growth by the deep
restructuring of the composition of GDP , by less consumption, more investment, and
more exports [22]. The specificity of the Bokros-package was its focus on the fiscal
expenditure side of the budget, where restructuring implied drastic cuts, and a strategic
attack against wages and salaries, welfare transfers and public investment.
Thus the social and short-term economic costs were no less impressive than the
results, and in general, the Bokros package once and for all changed the expectations of
Hungarian society, and "spending bureaucracy". 
How was this package implemented, and why was it politically feasible? I answer
these questions by sketching a few characteristics of policy style under the Horn-
government, and by identifiyng the broader political factors of the acceleration of
systemic change.
3.4. Failed Attempts at Policy Interaction, and Successful One-
man-shows 
As to the governments tactics, the Horn-government experimented with diverse
policy styles  ranging from negotiated to imperative strategies  in a variety of fields:
from fiscal adjustment, and institutional reform, to privatization. Most typically the
Horn-administration started with negotiation, failed, and resorted to more imperative
styles: to pressure and force rather than persuasion, improvization more than
preparation, to individual decision making rather than institutionalized compromise.
Hence "imperative" strategies became dominant, because the "interactive negotiated"
strategies failed, and in the atmosphere of recurring crisis the Premier gave free hand
and strong political backing to a few top policy makers whom he trusted. Moreover,
to resort to imperative strategies also was possible, because social protest against the
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[22] In its philosophy, the Bokross program was similar to the strategy advocated by János Kornai (1995b).methods and their consequences was either moderate, or ineffectual [23]. These
shifts in the policy-style of the Horn-government could be observed in the case of the
failed Socioeconomic Pact of 199495, the style of the implementation of the Bokros-
package, major privatization strategies, and the legislative decision on how to use the
unexpected huge inflow of privatization revenues in late 1995.
Initially, the Horn-government seemed to prefer negotiation and cooperation to
pressure: in accordance with the coalition's electoral promises, and using the framework
of Hungary's major tripartite corporatist forum, the Interest Reconciliation Council,
extensive negotiations with the major trade unions and business associations started right
after the new government was enacted. The negotiations aimed at a Socio-Economic
Agreement on the transformation strategy for the next three years. The parties were to
come to agreement on the major stabilization measures, the reform of state household,
the principles of privatization, the extent and ways of further labor-market liberalization,
of real-wage losses, and their compensation. In early February 1995 it was officially
declared that the Pact had failed. Most participants and a few observers stressed factors
such as the missing long-term strategy of the government, or the rigidity of the trade
unions to accept short-term losses in exchange for long-term gains [Héthy, 1996] [24].
While pacting was impossible, outright pressure still seemed to be a feasible way of
enforcing the breakthrough of stabilization and adjustment. Actually, this is what had
happened.
The Bokros-stabilization plan avoided negotiation and consultation from its birth. The
package was prepared in secrecy by Bokros and a few other economists, and was put to
the agenda of the coalition-parties and the legislation with a strong political backing by the
Premier: this was one important reason why it got almost unanimous approval from the
coalition parties which had a supermajority of about two-thirds of the parliamentary
votes. While implementing his program, Bokros similarly preferred outright pressure and
force to convincing, and collaboration with other administrative agencies. I believe this
policy style mostly originated in the logic underlying his program. While his original plan
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[23] The reasons in part can be found in "old" factors of political patience mentioned in section 2. But the
other part of the explanation is closely connected to the consolidation period: the economic and social
structural changes induced by the chosen transformation path, and becoming more and more accentuated by
the mid-90s, further impaired the capacities for collective action of its losers (see section 4). 
[24] I believe that, in part, the Pact was not to be signed because this would have increased the political
capital of the Premiers both main rivals, Békesi, and Sándor Nagy, the Chairman of the largest trade union
MSZOSZ. On his part, Békesi invested in the success: he was actively participating in the negotiations and was
ready to concessions in terms of both softening, and delaying some of his adjustment measures. Similarly, Nagy
much more than other union bosses was moderate: in principle he was not against accepting real-wage losses
in exchange for compensation in organizational and political issues. There is a sense that Horn did not really
support that these two men would come to an agreement, rather it was the failure of the pact which entailed
gains for the Premier in terms of his own relative political standing [Kohegyi, 1995].envisaged comprehensive rationalization plans for the public sector, enabling an "ordered
retreat" of the state with substantial savings as a result, those plans were not available,
and could not have been prepared without time-consuming bargaining and coordination.
Bokros opted for an offensive method of trial and error rather than preparation and
negotiation [25]. He drastically cut fiscal expenditures in many budgetary areas, and
granted wage-increases only in exchange for downsizing employment. No wonder, that
his strategy left Bokros with little support in administration. Still, the Bokros-package in
its most important elements could break through.
Similar to macroeconomic stabilization, and fiscal reforms, in the issue of privatization
and privatization-control, the Horn-government initially took a consultative and negotiating
stance. Negotiation in this area was to ease the conflicts both within and outside state
administration on issues such as: (1) who should control privatization  the Finance Minister
or other bodies such as the State Property Agency and the branch ministries (2), which
interest groups and political parties were going to get access to the headquarters of the
privatization strategy and practice and in which way (the trade unions showed hyper-activity
in this debate), (3) what were the correct strategies to be pursued: those maximizing cash-
receipts or those creating more jobs, or more Hungarian owners, and finally (4) how
privatization should be (re)organized and legislated. In 1994 Finance Minister László Békesi
tried, and initially succeeded, to expand his control to the legal framework, strategy,
government agencies, and receipts in this field [Sárközy, 1996]. But according to some
observers the Finance Ministers time-consuming administrative and legislative preparation
to overtake the control over privatization could be itself one of the factors why privatization
was practically brought to a halt in 1994, at least this was used against him later. All in all,
around late 1994 the Premier personally nullified one large privatization contract, fired
Békesis man responsible for privatization, and nominated his political and personal
intimate, Tamás Suchman as a Minister of Privatization without portfolio.
Although nobody initially believed that the committed Socialist Tamás Suchman will
become the heroe of Hungarys property sell-off, under his leadeship privatization
dramatically accelerated. Cash receipts both in HUF and foreign exchange were looming
[26] (see Table 3 in Appendix). Suchman in his own field fought the same "Blitzkrieg" with
the same controversial success as Bokros in the field of public finance. His criterion for
19
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 31  Consolidating Economic Reforms ...
[25] His decision might have been influenced by the failure of earlier attempts to reform public finance.
Whenever the task of elaborating their own reform and rationalization plans was delegated to the ministries
themselves, those reforms failed to happen.
[26] Suchman himself explained his commitment to fast methods and decisions in truly leftist ideological
terms. He said, "The reason why we have to privatize fast is not that the state is an inappropriate, or incapable
owner in general, but because at the moment it lacks the financial resources to restructure its firms". He also
said, "I shall do my best to avoid that one would introduce a new austerity program claiming that the receipts
from privatization are missing" [Kocsis, 1996; 556].his own success was to sell public property, which often involved quick personal decisions
without much consultation or negotiation, and he had the Premiers full support to do it.
Hence in terms of policy style he performed a "one-man show", with little attention to
institutionalized procedures and control, as is attested by the late 1996 large corruption
scandal.
Thus paradoxically in 1995  against the prevailing expectations  the challenge to
Bokross stabilization policies originated not in the fall-out, but in the unexpected, large
inflow of cash receipts from privatization. One had to decide about a sum which
according to various estimates was in the range of 260 to 400 bn HUFs, and in principle,
the outcome could have been a "negotiated" solution. Bokross view also supported by
the SZDSZ and a wide consensus of professionals was, that the extra-receipts should be
used for servicing the countrys foreign debt. Premier Horn, however, took the lead in
arguing that at least a part of the cash was to finance infrastructure, firm reorganization,
and other development projects. The Socialists, the largest party in Parliament were
taken by surprise by the revenues of that magnitude [27], they were neither prepared to
produce and assess alternative plans, nor to act in a cohesive and coordinated way. Finally,
60 Socialist MPs in alliance with the SZDSZ and the opposition, voted against Horn, and
favored fast legislative decision to negotiation and bargaining with various spending
lobbies and bureaucracies [28].
The Horn-government had two more policy-packages which are generally
considered as successes in the literature: the first is the privatization of the banking sector
at a tremendeous pace, and to a remarkably large extent. As a result by 1998 the
Hungarian banking system is to 75% private, and  reflecting both the effect privatization,
and of the expansion of foreign greenfield operation in banking  to almost two-third
foreign owned [29]. The last reform success story mentioned here is the breakthrough
of the pension reform. While the politics of this reform is detailed in Joan Nelsons
comparative study (1998), I mention here only one that while rebuilding the pension
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[27] Note that this sum was between one-quarter to one-third of the total cash-receipts from privatization
accumulated between 199097.
[28] Negotiation could partly be avoided, because for spending the unexpected cashthere were no credible
programs available Other explanations are that there were too many competing priorities, or that MPs in MSZP
still had been under the shock of Hungarys external imbalance.
[29] As I argued above the expensive consolidation of the banks and their debtors under the Antall-
government was and important condition of this success: earlier attempts at privatization mostly failed because
of the banks precarious financial standing. However, this large share of foreign ownership in banking is rather
unprecedented in all Europe: there are only three more countries  Belgium (45%), Luxemburg (60%), and
the U.K. (91%)  where foreign ownership was around or above 50% in 1990 [Törékeny stabilizáció, 1997;
103]. Interesting enough, this unusual feature of Hungarian capitalism and the risks and opportunities inherent
in having a foreign-owned banking sector  also accompanied by a 100% foreign ownership in the insurance
sector  remained, for the time being, undertheorized in the literature. Nevertheless, the first analyses report
on intensive investment activity and improvements in financial services.system the Horn-government indeed followed the tactic of consultation, negotiation, and
political and bureaucratic alliance building.
Let me finally come back to my earlier question on the political factors behind the
acceleration of reforms between 199598. I believe, in addition to the important
"preparatory reforms" undertaken, and the crucial new political commitments made by
the Antall-government, at least two other factors more characteristic to the Horn-period
had an important role. One is the consolidation of both the political institutions, and the
state institutions by the second phase of the Hungarian transformation. The other is the
coalition building tactics inherent in the Horn-governments privatization strategy.
3.5. Consolidation of the Political System, and Coalition-building 
by Privatization
While the argument about the positive effect of the consolidation of political and
democratic institutional system on the process of Hungarian transformation is convincingly
made by Haggard, Kaufman, and Shugart (1998), I shall highlight only two aspects of this
development. One considers the fact, that by the mid-1990s Hungarys important political
parties, on their part, fully internalized the constraints and opportunities inherent in
Hungarys actual economic situation, and the countrys old and new international economic
and political commitments both in their election and coalition programs, and the Horn-
government to some extent could count on this. Specifically, the parties were much more
keen on collecting protest votes than seriously suggesting or implementing policies satisfying
the short-term demands of aggrieved constituencies. Rather than making too bombastic
economic promises, or challenging the path of international integration, the parties of the
entire Hungarian political spectrum from the right to the left end, de facto proved to be
capable of governing and building legislative majorities, or even issue-specific alliances
transgressing the divide between government and opposition around quite similar major
political and economic policy objectives [30].
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[30] Save for the communist Workers Party, and the racist extreme right Party of Hungarian Justice and Life
which however until 1998 could not mobilize significant political support. However, Even the Smallholder Party,
which is generally termed "populist" in the Hungarian political discourse, and used both aggressive rhetoric, and
political mobilization against the Horn-government and its policies, did embrace many suggestions of the
Washington-consensus in its 1995 party-program. Smallholders campaigned on a moderate economic platform in
1998, and did I believe, as the junior member of Hungarys recent government, will either prove to be "bait and
switch populist", or will leave the coalition. The latter term is coined by Paul Drake characterizing Latin American
personalist leaders who campaign on a populist platform only to switch abruptly to market-oriented policies
following election [Drake, 1991; 36]. Economic populism, then, was "the dog, which did not bark" in Hungary. A
similar phenomenon in the Polish context was pointed out by Leszek Balcerowicz (1995; 300).Secondly the economic transformation strategy was also embedded in the
emerging new structure of bureaucratic power. Due to the long traditions of
Hungarys relative external openness  stemming, irony of the ironies, not least from
the heavy external debt, and Hungarys resulting early IMF, and World Bank-
membership  Hungarian policy making and financial bureaucracy from the early
1980s became involved and integrated in international professional, policy-making
and financial networks. This created skills  experience with IMF and World Bank
staff and policy programs, negotiating and bargaining with foreign creditors [31] or
investors  which were not less, but more badly needed when the changes came.
Rather than losing with economic transformation this reform bureaucracy
consolidated its influence in politics and policy making. By the mid-1990s their power
was also institutionalized in the dominance of the Ministry of Finance and the
Hungarian National Bank over rival bureaucratic strongholds, and the leadership of
the Finance Minister over the "spending ministries". Also supported by the consensus
of most economists on "what was to be done" the reform-bureaucracy had become
a strong advocate of fast roads to capitalism, and decisive steps in economic hard
times. 
Finally, a closer look at Table 1 and 3 reveals one more factor of the acceleration
of privatization. By using a wide variety of methods from compensation-vouchers to
cheap existence-building loans (E-loans), and direct sales for HUF or foreign
exchange, and by an intensified recycling of substantial amounts of privatization
revenues into firm-reorganization, Premier Horn built up the largest possible
coalition of beneficiaries of his policies [32]. A broad range of economic actors  from
the clientele of the Antall-regime (the owners of the restitution vouchers), to foreign
and domestic investors, and would-be-private firms expecting bailout and capital for
reorganization  became directly dependent upon, and interested in fast
privatization, and large inflows of privatization revenues, and in part this is why
privatization could accelerate.
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[31] These skills even might have entalied capacities of outmaneuvernig the external actors by domestic
bureaucrats [Csaba, 1995], or designing policy programs with a large domestic intellectual value-added.
Greskovits (1998) concludes that Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslovak policy makers enjoyed higher degrees of
relative autonomy of policy formulation than their colleagues in the less integrated Romania, Bulgaria, or for that
matter, the Baltic States.
[32] For an excellent and detailed analysis of ex-communist Socialists coalition-management in Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia, and the interaction of social coalition-building with external constraints see Silitski (1998). 4. What Kind of Democracy, and What Kind 
of Capitalism Has Consolidated?
Against the gloomy expectations Hungarian democracy survived the transformational
recession and also contributed to the success of economic transformation. But the crisis
left behind much political damage. Democracy in Hungary could take root only at the cost
of some of its qualitative aspects, such as its representativeness, inclusionary features, and
its capacity to evenly provide and protect civil liberties. Many important ingredients of
fully developed Western-type democracies continue to be in short supply in the new
Hungarian political system.
Throughout the past decade it was all the time obvious that  because of the dire
economic situation left behind by socialism and aggravated by the transformational
recession  the emerging system would be incapable of meeting even some of the most
justified demands for acceptable living standards and security of large social groups
including those of the lower and lower-middle working classes of the Kádár-regime. Thus
the major dilemma the political system had to face was the political representation of the
millions pushed to the margin by the crisis and the transformation strategy. If their
demands had got immediate, strong political representation, and were to become major
issues on the agenda of economic transformation, they had paved the way to economic
chaos, and short-lived populist democracy. Conversely, if the essential democratic
institutions and capitalism simultaneously were to taking root under economic stress, the
political system had to exclude justified but unfeasible economic demands from the
discourse as political non-issues. In this sense with a bit of exaggeration: the emerging
Hungarian democracy had to simultaneously perform the democratic agenda of political
integration, and the authoritarian agenda of political exclusion. It succeeded in both: and
got consolidated as a democracy with strong exclusionary features [33]. This is the price
Hungarian democrats paid for building capitalism in democratic settings after socialism.
As to the institutional and organizational consequences of the above political logic I
mention only two: (1) there is a pervasive lack of both civil organizations representing
various loserss groups, and channels  other than voting in elections  for civil control
over state policy in general. (2) While the elite-echelons of ex-communist labor unions
were to some extent included in power, and used their allliance with elites to defeat rival
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[33] Hungarian democracy is, to some extent, "undemocratic" not only in terms of the tension between its
exclusionary, and inclusionary dimensions. To use Guillermo ODonnells and Phillippe Schmitters famous
concept (1986) Hungary also represents a case of democracy building by "undemocratic means": specifically by
exclusive elite pacts. See for these milestones of Hungarian transformation Greskovits (1998a).civil organizations and the new non-communist trade unions, labor at the shop-floor is
mostly left alone, and unrepresented. The victory of the ex-communist unions, and the
transformational recession in combination resulted in the decline or dissolution of all new
trade unions: the Solidarity Workers Alliance, the League of Democratic Trade Unions,
and the Workerss Councils. Based on the evidence of these developments in Hungary,
and according to the concept elaborated by Acuna and Smith (1994) in the Latin
American context I classified Hungarian democracy as a "dual democratic regime" where
the systems stability is based on the alliance of political and state elite with a strategic
minority of the potential opposition to economic policies, where the purpose of the
alliance is to exclude "the majority of the remaining social actors by disarticulating and
neutralizing their capacity for collective action" [Acuna and Smith, 1994, 47; Greskovits,
1998; ch. 9]. As a consequence large sectors of the Hungarian society continue to be both
marginalized in the economy, and excluded from political representation. Moreover,
those who are on the margin economically, and are largely unrepresented in politics
typically lose in terms of provision and protection of their human and civil rights as well.
Is this new market sociey durable? Is the "low-level equilibrium" between the
incomplete democracy, and the type of the emerging market economy stable? How long
will the tension between the integrative and the exclusive, antidemocratic features of the
political system prevail? Can economic transformation further advance in the atmosphere
of social patience in the next decade? These are big questions, and I have only tentative
suggestions. 
Hungarian democratic capitalism seems to be consolidated in the sense that while
there is an ongoing debate on its details no robust political challenge to either its
democratic or capitalist component is in sight. Moreover, as I streesed above the past
decade brought about crucial international political commitments which magnified the
costs of abandoning the chosen path. Thus there are good chances that the new system
will prevail in the medium term as it is now: without much probability of an authoritarian
turnabout, but also without automatic guarantees of development towards a democracy
of better quality. On one hand, reform elites need not be enticed by authoritarian
temptations to defend their interests because the transformation strategies they favor
will not be effectively challenged by the society. But on other hand  and for similar
reasons  I think there will not be strong societal pressure for more inclusion, and more
liberalism either. Hence politicians have a great responsibility.
I base my above hypotheses on emerging evidence of the economic and social
structural impact of the transformation strategies implemented throughout the decade,
and at an accelerated speed during the past four years rush towards capitalism. In brief
my argument is that the structural changes induced by the chosen transformation path
further impaired the capacities for collective action of its losers, particularly large
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the following changes that deserve particular attention.
One of the most visible structural adaptation processes is the dramatically increasing
share of private non-industrial employment, and a rapid decrease of the average plant-
size [34]. One dimension of this process, the emergence of many hundred-thousands of
small or medium size firms and their growing role in output and employment [Laki, 1997]
is visible not only in Hungary, but elsewhere in Eastern Europe too. But it is a Hungarian
specificity, that at the opposite end there has been a rapid rise in the scope of operations
of the local subsidiaries of large multinational corporations which by now led to their clear
dominance in a number of important sectors (see Törékeny stabilizáció, 1997, and
Hegymenet, 1998 for the forthcoming details of the Hungarian multinational export
sector). Both above types of economic organizations prefer forms of employment with
limitations on institutionalized representation of interest or collective protest (for the
description of the Hungarian labor relations below see Ladó, 1996, and Ellingstad, 1997).
As to the first matter: about one-third of Hungarian employees are covered by collective
agreements  mainly the employees of the shrinking public or semi-public industry and
services. Roughly a second third of the workers  including those employed by the
multinational corporations  have individual contracts, while much of the rest  including
migrants  do not have any: they are hired and fired under precarious conditions by the
small-scale firms of the (mostly informal) economy. The presence and activity of trade
unions in the firms and at the shop-floor level is in conformity with the above pattern:
specifically about two-third of Hungarian labor force is not (or at least not directly)
represented by unions: they are mostly absent in the sectors dominated either by the
small-medium firms, or by the multinational corporations. Where the unions are,
however, present, they are mostly very silent: in striking contrast with the vocal and noisy
elite-unionism in the political parties, parliamentary factions, national tripartite
corporatist forums, and a number of important redistributive centres of the governemnt
administration such as the self-governing bodies of the pension, and health-care funds.
Apparently, dual democracy, and dramatic economic structural change, in combination,
resulted in a dual system of labor representation and industrial relations. As far as the
work conditions of those employed on the "margins" by the small- and medium-scale
economy is concerned, there is a strong sense that the absence of both collective
representation and state control and, in general, the defenselessness of labor allows and
maintains low levels of job stability, dependence upon income from piecework, poor
working and health-conditions, little access to training, impediments to collective
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[34] See for the negative effect of similar processes on labor in Western Europe Pontusson (1995).negotiation, and often subjection to authoritarian relations or outright oppression in the
workplace. As the case of Chile, the most advanced neoliberal reform-country in Latin
America shows, such anomic and unhappy situations may long prevail provided that the
strategic export-sectors of the economy  in Chile 810 large, export-oriented and
internationally integrated conglomerates  consider the low cost, and "flexibility" of labor
employed under precarious conditions by their suppliers  the domestic semi-informal
small and medium-scale firms  as a major factor of their international competitiveness
[Díaz, 1993]. The lesson from Chiles above pattern of integrating its dual economy is: a
more cohesive, more integrated and efficient capitalist economy does not automatically
lead to better work- and life conditions. It may lead to the opposite if the improved
cohesion and international competitivity of the national economy occurs in part at the
cost of oppressing large segments of labor.
In the above respect the level of internal cohesiveness and integration of the
Hungarian economy apparently has not reached the Chilean standards yet. For instance
there is little contact and, even less cooperation between the MNC-dominated leading
export-sectors, and the Hungarian firms oriented to a larger extent towards the domestic
market, including the small and medium size companies. Instead the most powerful and
influential, largely foreign, cohorts of Hungarian capitalism reside in an  economic and
political  "off-shore" status. They operate off-shore, mostly in the more developed
Transdanubia or Budapest, enjoy tax-reliefs, low-price real estate for locating their plants,
and other incentives provided by the central and local governments. Rather than
acquiring inputs from domestic firms they typically buy foreign: their suppliers are either
firms abroad, or foreign firms setting up their Hungarian production facilities next to their
buyers, and likewise in off-shore status. These firms have their own associations, but
neither are they members of Hungarian business organizations, nor are they participating
in the national tripartite corporatist bodies and negotiations. Supposedly they are able to
reach the government with their economic policy preferences, but they apparently do
not use the more or less formalized and visible channels of interest intermediation for
these purposes. They are almost exclusively export-oriented, hence it is not the
conditions of the Hungarian, but of their export-market upon which they ultimately
depend, and which govern their decisions on investment, production and sales.
Consequently, they are also largely autonomous vis-a-vis government policies shaping the
domestic economic conditions  be their effect recessionary, or expansionary. Their
autonomy resulted in benevolent effects in 199596, when notwithstanding the
recessionary impulses of the Bokros stabilization and adjustment plan the foreign
multinationals completed massive investment projects [Töréspontok, 1996]. But what
about the opposite situation: how to balance the Hungarian economy in case of a larger
recession abroad? The latter situation could cause really big troubles given that the
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was: its most strategic part, manufacturing essentially means ten firms and ten products.
To deal with the effects of a recession abroad seems to be substantially more out of the
reach of Hungarian economic policy than ever before. Let me finally conclude, and also
ask the question: is there anything that politicians and policy makers in other countries,
and, specifically, in Poland can learn from the Hungarian experience?
5. Conclusions, and Lessons for Other Countries,
and Specifically, Poland 
(1) By 1998 Hungarys social system is democratic capitalism, which is a success both
in terms of its own past, and in comparison with many other countries in post-socialist
Eastern Europe. This success is the combined result of many factors.
(2) One factor is nothing but "virtue of lack" [35]: unlike in many other countries of
the post-socialist region neither the peaceful or forceful formation of national identity nor
of a new, independent state were important items on the Hungarian transformation
agenda, and they could neither seriously conflict with, nor dominate over the issues of
economic and political transformation [36]. 
(3) Another important factor was that even if the Hungarian economy did not always
perform much better than other economies, by the actors of international capital and
financial markets it has more or less constantly been perceived as a would-be success
story. To the extent that this was important, then, the Hungarian success, in part, can be
attributed to "the power of path-finding expectations" abroad [37].
(4) Still as a third set of advantageous preconditions: Hungary inherited relatively
favourable legacies from state socialism: one of them was that the Hungarian state did not
collapse by the time transformation speeded up. Other legacies contributed to stability
rather than to destabilization in the first period of the Hungarian transformation. They did
so in three ways: by creating winners who supported (or at least did not oppose) the
transformation; patient losers who granted reformist politicians with relatively long "grace
periods" to implement economic measures, and by leaving behind domestic and external
constraints to irresponsible economic adventurism.
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[35] The expression, in a different context is used by Grant (1998).
[36] See Bunce 1998 for similar thoughts. 
[37] And, of course, to many other, partly domestic, political and economic factors, which I shall highlight
later in my essay. I borrow the above expression from Federowicz (1997).(5) In part, these or similar legacies played a role in a number of other countries of
North-West Eastern Europe, but I believe it was Hungary where their positive effect was
the strongest, and thus the political dynamics of transformation was most stable.
Specifically, from a birds-eye-view Hungary and Poland seem to be similar, their legacies
were not unfavourable, and their results are among the best ones states of the East could
achieve. They both have more or less stabilized, expanding, internationally integrated
economies, and fairly stable political systems characterized by several successive, fair, and
competitive elections, and other democratic institutions. Civil rights, in general are
observed in both countries. Hungary and Poland, with one-tenth of the population of the
whole post-socialist East succeeded to acquire roughly one-half of both the foreign direct
investment, and institutional credit granted to the region altogether.
(6) But, clearly, the success is not a pure reflection of the legacies and of the initial
conditions: policy choices and the continuous balancing between the democratic and
capitalist aspects of transformation were extremely important, and in these respects
Hungary and Poland seem to be rather different. Specifically, Hungary opted for
disciplined debt-management, while Poland chose its opportunity of debt-forgiveness and
rescheduling. Hungarys choice dramatically increased its dependence upon international
integration including its export-orientation, dependence upon hard-currency cash from
privatization, foreign greenfield direct investment, and financial integration. As a
consequence  also explained by the much smaller size of its national economy  Hungary
became much more internationally integrated than Poland. with all the risks and
opportunities inherent in such a situation. 
(7) As a first step, Hungary drastically  and in part wantonly  decimated its
economic capacity, then invested huge amounts into restructuring, and, finally selling off
both its SOEs, and banks: mainly to foreigners. As a result in all East it came closest 
much closer than Poland  to the case of former GDR where virtually the whole business
elite is "foreign". At the same time Hungary got farthest  much farther than Poland 
from the other extreme exhibited by Eastern "national capitalisms". Thus Hungary and
Poland in the beginning of their second decade of democratic capitalism face rather
different structure of opportunities and risks: Hungarys risks are inherent in its
remarkable dependence upon its foreign capitalists, an the global international system,
while for the time being Poland still seems relatively more dependent upon its national
capitalists, and state ownership.
(8) The processes leading to the above outcomes accelerated under Hungarys
second democratic government. The politics of consolidating reforms exhibited less
consultation and negotiation, less political protest, and more imperative and fast decisions
than one approach of the political economy to policy reform would have expected. An
important lesson, for other countries, and for Poland than, is, that if consultation and
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although socially traumatic  way of enforcing the breakthrough of stabilization and
adjustment. Imperative methods will work especially if the external pressure is intensive,
if the enforced measures are well prepared by the previous administration, and if
influential social interests are accommodated and "payed off" including the governments
tolerance to their unbridled profit- and rent-seeking, as exemplified by the Hungarian
case [38].
(9) However, a next lesson offered is that, privatization  including the Hungarian
practice of fast sell-off to foreigners  is very expensive. We might conclude that  in the
medium or longer run  revenues from privatization as such do not exist. Instead, in
Hungary  in a self-propelling process  revenues from privatization were largely spent
for (more) privatization: either for preparing firms or banks for privatization by
restructuring, reorganization, or bailout, or for creating support for privatization (by
restitution and cheap credits), or, finally for attracting foreign investors either by one of
the above methods or by mintaining their trust and interest by accelerated debt-
repayment [39].
(10) As to the political effect of the road to capitalism Hungarian democracy proved
to be crisis-proof, but consolidated as dual, exclusive democracy with a weak capacity to
provide equality and evenly protect civil and human rights. Losers of Hungarian economic
transformation are losers in political terms as well: they are hardly  represented, their
rights are not sufficiently protected in democratic politics. Thus the democratic capitalist
system in Hungary is stable but Janus-faced. Its consolidation also brought about the
emergence of contradictory and dualistic features in polity, economy, and society. 
(11) For the foreseeable future Hungarys major risks lie in its economic and social
dualism and vulnerability resulting from (a) the chosen export-oriented strategy largely
based on its off-shore multinational companies, and characterized by an
overconcentration of its exports on only but a few firms and products, a few regions, and
heavy dependence on imported inputs; (b) from its large but largely informal small and
medium-size firm, sector; and (c) from its dualistic political system, and labor relations.
(12) The major lesson for Hungarian politicians and policy makers, then, is: there is
much yet to be "democratized" in Hungarian democracy, and more to be done  not least
by the Hungarian government  for a more cohesive, more integrated economy and
society. Moreover, an efficient, integrated, and dynamic economy does not automatically
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[38] For an original approach to the problem of rent-seeking in the context of neoliberal transformations
in Latin America see Schamis (1998).
[39] For a similar argument on the former GDR see Brada (1996; 71), and on the Czech Republic Hayri,
and McDermott (1998).result in more equitable and liberal democracy. The corrective and inclusive function of
the political system cannot be substituted for pure economic strategies, rather there is a
separate need for institutions of more generous political inclusion, and for mechanisms of
sharing the gains when they materialize.
(13) Finally, the major lesson for other countries including Poland, which have not
made as strong strategic commitments as Hungary did is to think seriously in the trade-
offs between the risks this country avoided and the ones it took. The balance can turn
out to be both positive, and negative. Which will be the actual case in the medium run is
hard to tell for the time being.
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Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total













guarantees  due (bn
HUF)
 (4)
14.5 17.3 15.0 21.1 34.9 46.6 149.4









173.0 549.0 534.0 435.0 398.0 n.a. n.a.
As a %  of total
outlays
(5)
7.6 28.5 21.3 15.0 12.8 n.a. n.a.
Table 1. Debt Relief and Equity Capital Provided to Banks and SOEs, and Bad Debts
in 199297 in Hungary
Sources: 
(1) Fordulat és folytonosság 1995; 98. 
(2) Fordulat és folytonosság 1995; 96. and Töréspontok 1996; 90. The major beneficiaries were: Magyar
Hitel Bank, Kereskedelmi Bank, Budapest Bank, Takarékbank, Mezobank, Dunabank, Agrobank,
Iparbankház. Actually, the banking sector got even more than this. Even after the consolidation program was
concluded in 1994, several banks continued to receive further capital injections. 
(3) Granted to Budapest Bank in early 1995 [Töréspontok 1996; 91], and in 1996, to Magyar Hitelbank,
Konzumbank, Magyar Befektetési és Fejlesztési Bank Rt in 199596 [Törékeny stabilizáció 1997; 967].
(4) Hegymenet 1998; 150.
(5) Fordulat és folytonosság 1995; 98, and Törékeny Stabilizáció 1997; 96.32
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Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Budget  deficit as
a share of GDP
(%)
0.0 -4.9 -7.0 -5.7 -7.5 -5.4 -2.3 -4.1
Current  account
balance as a  share
of GDP (%)
0.4 0.8 -2.9 -9.6 -9.4 -5.7 -3.7 -2.0
GDP growth  rate
(%, previous
year=100)









-3.5 -7.0 -1.4 -3.9 7.2 -12.2 -5.4 4.9
Table 2. Hungarian Macroeconomic and Social Indicators Before and After
the Bokros-package
Sources:











































































Form  of revenues 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
bn HUF 0.14 4.81 17.55 27.61 25.71 25.71 25.09 108.78 235.40
Foreign  exchange ( in bn
HUF)
0.53 24.61 110.67 10.95 10.95 412.05 77.50 208.39 885.65
Total cash 0.67 29.42 128.22 38.56 36.6 437.76 102.59 317.17 1091.05
Compensation  vouchers n.a. n.a. 2.26 14.56 64.2 18.48 41.63 22.66 163.79
E-loans n.a. 1.01 9.07 21.72 29.27 3.92 2.44 0.30 67.73
Foreign  exchange  loans and
other
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.84 n.a. 5.16 3.80 25.80
Dividends n.a. 0.93 7.41 5.41 7.80 13.81 8.15 5.77 49.28
Total revenues  in current
prices
0.67 31.36 146.96 80.25 154.77 473.97 159.97 349.70 1397.65
Total revenues  in 1997  prices 3.0 105.4 401.3 178.9 290.3 693.4 189.4 349.7 2211.4
FDI (mn USD) 1200
(1989-90)
1614 1641 2481 1320 4570 2040 2107 16973
Table 3. Government Revenues from Privatization (bn HUF), and Foreign Direct Investment (bn USD) in Hungary 
in 19901997
Sources: Hegymenet 1998; 148, and 48, and Törékeny stabilizáció 1997; 20References
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